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I. INTRODUCTION 
From its predecessors dating back to 1913 to the current version, 
the California Talent Agencies Act of 1978 (“TAA” or “the Act”) 
has aimed to protect artists from talent agents who would take ad-
vantage of them.1  The Act originally prohibited agents from “send-
ing artists to ‘house[s] of ill fame’ or saloons, or allowing ‘persons 
of bad character’ to frequent their establishments.”2  By requiring 
talent agents to have a license, “the Act establishes detailed require-
ments for how the licensed talent agencies conduct their business, 
including a code of conduct, submission of contracts and fee sched-
ules to the state, maintenance of a client trust account, posting of a 
bond, and prohibitions against discrimination, kickbacks, and certain 
conflicts of interest.”3 
  
 * J.D. Candidate, Franklin Pierce Law Center (2010); B.A., Mass Communica-
tions, Bloomsburg University (2000). 
 1. Marathon Entm’t, Inc. v. Blasi, 174 P.3d 741, 746 (Cal. 2008). 
 2. Id. (discussing the purposes of the Act). 
 3. Id. at 747. 
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However, despite this well-intentioned beginning, the Act no 
longer binds itself to business realities.4  Instead, the Act turns a 
blind eye to the “catch-22” of new artists and their personal manag-
ers: without enough success, talent agents are not interested in the 
artists, but without a talent agent, there is no legal way for the new 
artist to procure the required employment to find such success.5  Per-
sonal managers frequently face the difficult decision of violating the 
Act by procuring employment, which then puts their contract in 
jeopardy because of the illegal procurement.6  Without procurement 
in the first place though, there will be no success, nor need for a tal-
ent agent.7 
The California courts’ allowance of a “gotcha” by artists who 
want to disavow an otherwise valid contract drives poor behavior 
and does not protect the personal managers who work so diligently 
to help the artists attain a level of success.8  If the Act was indeed 
created to protect artists, and the procurement of employment pro-
tects artists’ interests, then personal managers should be protected 
from artists disavowing contracts.9  Further, the Marathon Enter-
tainment, Inc. v. Blasi court did not go far enough in its guidance on 
severability.10  In that case, the court failed to bring the Act back to a 
  
 4. Erick Flores, Note, “That’s a Wrap! (Or Is It?)”: The Unanswered Question 
of Severability Under California’s Talent Agencies Act After Marathon Entertain-
ment, Inc. v. Blasi, 97 GEO. L.J. 1333, 1338 (2009). 
 5. Id. at 1335–36; Gary A. Greenberg, Note, The Plight of the Personal Man-
ager in California: A Legislative Solution, 6 HASTINGS J. COMM. & ENT. L. 837, 
839–40 (1984). 
 6. Flores, supra note 4, at 1341–42; see Greenberg, supra note 5, at 839–40 
(noting personal managers either must obtain a license or operate in violation of 
the statute). 
 7. See Flores, supra note 4, at 1342. 
 8. Id. at 1343; see Greenberg, supra note 5, at 857 (noting the fairness of a 
remedy that compensates the artist without having to compensate the manager 
seems questionable). 
 9. See Greenberg, supra note 5, at 857 (noting the severe damage to a personal 
manager from what may constitute nothing more than an “administrative over-
sight”). 
 10. See Marathon, 174 P.3d at 752; cf. Tracie Parry-Bowers, Note, The Talent 
Agencies Act: A Call for Reform, 27 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 431, 447 (2007) (dis-
cussing the California Court of Appeal’s decision, which Marathon affirmed). 
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common-sense approach, and this opinion will only continue to open 
the door to problems in the future.11 
This article will review the Act’s important provisions and the 
precedent that shaped its administration.  Next, this article will ad-
dress the problems with the Act itself and how it violates basic 
common law contract principles.  Finally, this article will suggest 
solutions for the Marathon court and the Act itself. 
II. IMPORTANT PROVISIONS OF THE TALENT AGENCIES ACT 
The Act requires anyone who “engages in the occupation of pro-
curing, offering, promising, or attempting to procure employment or 
engagements for an artist or artists” 12 to be registered with the State 
of California as a talent agent.13  To become a licensed talent agent, 
one must submit two sets of fingerprints and affidavits of at least 
two reputable residents stating that “the applicant is a person of good 
moral character, or in the case of a corporation, has a reputation for 
fair dealing.”14  The applicant must then submit $25015 and deposit a 
surety bond in the penal sum of $50,000 payable to the people of the 
State of California.16 
The Act provides a variety of protections for artists.  Talent 
agents must submit form contracts that the Labor Commissioner 
must approve.17  The Labor Commissioner looks for any language 
that is “unfair, unjust and oppressive to the artist.”18  Though not 
expressly stated in the statute, unions typically restrict talent agents’ 
commissions to a maximum commission percentage,19 while per-
  
 11. See Flores, supra note 4, at 1354–56 (discussing problems resulting from 
Blasi and various potential solutions). 
 12. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4 (West 2003 & Supp. 2010). 
 13. Id. § 1700.5. 
 14. Id. § 1700.6. 
 15. Id. § 1700.12. 
 16. Id. §§ 1700.15–.16. 
 17. Id. 
 18. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.23. 
 19. Greenberg, supra note 5, at 842; David Zelenski, Note, Talent Agents, Per-
sonal Managers, and Their Conflicts in the New Hollywood, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 
979, 989–90 (2003). 
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sonal managers’ commissions, which are not subject to the Act, are 
not subject to these union restrictions.20 
III. PRECEDENT THAT SHAPED THE ACT PRIOR TO MARATHON 
ENTERTAINMENT, INC. V. BLASI 
Prior to the landmark Marathon decision, cases involving the 
Act typically voided the entire contract with the personal manager 
and required the personal manager to return all proceeds from the 
contract.21  Despite the fact that the Act uses the language “engages 
in the occupation of procuring,” the courts have found that any 
booking, incidental or not, is considered a violation of the Act.22  
The courts have not, in any way, differentiated between full-time 
work as a talent agent versus the single procurement of a show for an 
aspiring artist by an unlicensed personal manager.23 
In Waisbren v. Peppercorn Productions, Inc.,24 Waisbren, the 
personal manager, sued when he was not paid commissions accord-
ing to the contract with Peppercorn.25  Peppercorn’s sole defense 
was that Waisbren procured employment for Peppercorn without 
being a licensed talent agent.26  Even though the court noted the 
“catch-22” with the need for personal managers to procure employ-
ment in the absence of talent agents, the court shied away from this 
quandary and held for Peppercorn, voiding the contract.27 
  
 20. See Heath B. Zarin, Note, The California Controversy over Procuring Em-
ployment: A Case for the Personal Managers Act, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 927, 941 (1997); Zelenski, supra note 19, at 991 (noting that 
while private franchise agreements regulate agents’ activities, the agreements do 
not regulate managers’ activities). 
 21. See, e.g., Yoo v. Robi, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 740, 747 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); Flo-
res, supra note 4, at 1347 (discussing prior cases which demonstrate that courts 
have been unwilling to apply severability to any contracts that violated the Act). 
 22. Marathon Entm’t, Inc. v. Blasi, 174 P.3d 741, 747–48 (Cal. 2008) (emphasis 
added). 
 23. Id. at 748. 
 24. 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437 (Ct. App. 1995). 
 25. Id. at 439. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 441, 446–47. 
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The court further relied on the California Entertainment Com-
mission’s (“the Commission”) report on the Act in which the Com-
mission proposed the continued prohibition of any procurement, in-
cidental or otherwise, by an unlicensed individual.28  The legislature 
fully adopted these proposals and endorsed the Commission’s find-
ings, which the Waisbren court found especially important.29  The 
Commission’s report even tackled New York’s equivalent of the 
Act, which exempts persons where their “business only incidentally 
involves the seeking of employment [for artists].”30  The Commis-
sion, and subsequently the legislature, found this provision to be 
unworkable and expressly declined to extend the incidental booking 
exception to personal managers.31 
The Waisbren court declared the disputed contract void as an il-
legal contract as the penalty for even a single act of procurement in 
violation of the Act.32  The court stood on the policy that an illegal 
contract cannot be enforced.33  In balancing the unjust enrichment to 
Peppercorn against the procurement activities of Waisbren, the court 
found that the balance weighed in favor of Peppercorn and deterring 
illegal conduct.34  Therefore, Waisbren was not entitled to any of the 
unpaid commissions.35 
IV. THE MARATHON COURT’S SHORTCOMINGS 
Marathon stands as the landmark and most recent case regarding 
the Act.  The California Supreme Court’s recent decision created 
some hope for personal managers by allowing the severance of ille-
gal parts of a contract while preserving valid parts.36  Unfortunately, 
the court did not force the Labor Commissioner to apply the doctrine 
  
 28. Id. at 444–45. 
 29. Id. 
 30. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 171(8) (McKinney 2004) (emphasis added). 
 31. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 442. 
 32. Id. at 447. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See Marathon Entm’t, Inc. v. Blasi, 174 P.3d 741, 751 (Cal. 2008) (applying 
the doctrine of severability to the Act). 
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of severability to every contract.37  Further, the court gave deference 
to the legislature’s wishes that incidental procurement still be con-
sidered a violation of the Act.38 
In this case, Marathon Entertainment, the defendant’s personal 
manager, sued Rosa Blasi because she did not pay the contractually 
defined 15 percent of earnings from entertainment employment.39  
Marathon claimed it “provided Blasi with lawful personal manager 
services by providing the down payment on her house, paying the 
salary of her business manager, providing her with professional and 
personal advice, and paying her travel expenses.”40 
The employment in question was Blasi’s role in the television se-
ries Strong Medicine.41  Blasi had reduced Marathon’s commission 
from 15 percent to 10 percent, and then later sought to replace Mara-
thon with her talent agent.42  Blasi defended the suit by filing a peti-
tion with the Labor Commissioner to declare that Marathon had vio-
lated the Act by illegally procuring employment without a license.43  
The Labor Commission agreed, voiding the contract ab initio and 
barring Marathon from any recovery.44  The trial court affirmed the 
Labor Commissioner’s ruling, but the court of appeal reversed in 
part, holding that severability was an option because Blasi had not 
established that Marathon wrongfully procured her a role in Strong 
Medicine.45 
On the heels of the court of appeal’s ruling, the California Su-
preme Court granted review and affirmed the court of appeal’s ruling 
with some guidance.46  First, it agreed with the court of appeal that 
the Act “regulates conduct, not labels; it is the act of procuring (or 
soliciting), not the title of one’s business, that qualifies one as a tal-
ent agency and subjects one to the Act’s licensure and related re-
  
 37. See Parry-Bowers, supra note 10, at 448 (transcribing the Labor Commis-
sioner’s opposition to the lower court’s decision). 
 38. Marathon, 174 P.3d at 748. 
 39. Id. at 744. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Marathon, 174 P.3d at 744. 
 45. Id. at 745. 
 46. Id. at 744–45. 
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quirements.”47  The court applied the Act to any personal manager or 
talent agent who procures employment, regardless of their title.48  
This closed the loophole left open by other decisions.  Personal man-
agers had argued that because they were not mentioned in the Act, 
they were not subject to its limitations.49  The court declined to rec-
ognize such a distinction and instead focused on the conduct, even 
incidental conduct, of procurement and the mandatory requirement 
for licensing.50 
The California Supreme Court did, however, give some hope to 
personal managers.  It used the California Civil Code section cover-
ing severability to allow valid parts of the contract to stay intact 
when it is possible to separate the illegal conduct from the legal con-
duct.51  Even though the Labor Commissioner had not expressly 
cited this section, the court relied on numerous other occasions 
where the Labor Commissioner severed contracts and allowed man-
agers to retain or seek commissions based on severability princi-
ples.52  The court further relied on a wide range of cases that allowed 
severability for contracts involving unlicensed services.53  The court 
stopped short of making severability mandatory and simply made it 
available to the Labor Commissioner “in order to avoid an inequita-
ble windfall or preserve a contractual relationship where doing so 
would not condone illegality.”54  The court explained by stating, “the 
fact [that] this remedy is often, or even almost always, appropriate, 
does not support the position that it is always proper.”55  Further, 
“full voiding of the parties’ contract is available, but not mandatory; 
likewise, severance is available, but not mandatory.”56 
As guidance, the court explained that to determine whether a 
contract clause is severable, courts must consider the “central pur-
  
 47. Id. at 747 (citing CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4(a) (West 2003)). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Marathon, 174 P.3d at 747. 
 51. Id. at 750–51 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 1599 (West 1982)). 
 52. Id. at 751. 
 53. Id. at 752. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 754. 
 56. Marathon, 174 P.3d at 754. 
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pose” of a contract.57  If the court determines that the parties in-
tended to engage in substantial procurement activities that are in-
separable from managerial services, then the court may void the en-
tire contract.58  However, an isolated instance of procurement does 
not automatically bar recovery for services that could lawfully be 
provided without a license, such as the loans, travel expenses, and 
salary of Blasi’s business manager.59 
For a Labor Commissioner drawn to fairness rather than admin-
istrative efficiency, this language may have been enough to give a 
fair shot to personal managers in these disputes.60  However, the La-
bor Commissioner responsible for the Marathon decision, Robert A. 
Jones, showed his predisposition against severability in a letter to 
Chief Justice Ronald George.61  Between the time of the court of 
appeal’s ruling and the California Supreme Court’s decision on 
whether to hear the case, Jones wrote to the Chief Justice urging him 
to de-publish the ruling so that he was not bound to the policy of 
severability.62  In the letter, Jones wrote: 
It is anticipated that if the decision in Marathon Entertain-
ment remains published and controlling, the Talent Agent 
Controversies hearings will be more complicated and time 
consuming in that the issues surrounding the severability of 
the contract will have to be addressed and the determination 
of whether the illegal procurement activity tainted the entire 
contract now before us. . . . The other anticipated result is 
that the ability of the Act to regulate unlicensed talent agents 
will be greatly eroded.63 
With the Labor Commissioner himself showing the predisposi-
tion against severability, the Marathon court’s ruling will likely have 
  
 57. Id. at 755. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See Parry-Bowers, supra note 10, at 449 (reiterating the Labor Commis-
sioner’s history of construing the Act harshly against personal managers). 
 61. Dave McNary, Commissioner Backs Blasi, DAILY VARIETY, Aug. 29, 2006, 
at 4, available at http://www.variety.com/article/VR1117949194.html. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
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little effect in promoting the use of severability.64  “If the Commis-
sioner feels that the ‘taint of illegality so permeates the entire agree-
ment that it cannot be removed by severance,’ he may still invalidate 
the entire agreement.”65  Given that the Commissioner has histori-
cally been harsh to personal managers, it is quite likely the Marathon 
ruling will carry no additional weight.66  In the past, even though the 
Commissioner has the ability to award the personal manager some 
compensation, he has typically invalidated the whole contract—
leaving the manager with nothing.67  As there has been no strong 
language from the courts that forces the Commissioner to sever con-
tracts, the great likelihood is that he will continue business as usual 
and invalidate future contracts ab initio.68 
Additionally, personal managers cannot escape the grasp of the 
Labor Commissioner.  The TAA requires an initial administrative 
filing with the Commissioner, giving him exclusive original jurisdic-
tion on any TAA matter.69  Disputes must be heard by the Commis-
sioner and all administrative remedies must be exhausted before the 
parties can proceed to superior court.70  Thus, even if the Commis-
sioner is predisposed against severing contracts, personal managers 
must still go through this administrative process to determine the 
contract’s validity under the TAA.71 
In denying Blasi’s summary judgment, the court found sufficient 
reasoning to allow severability in the contract, as evidence was not 
established that Marathon obtained Blasi’s role in Strong Medicine  
in violation of the Act.72  While the court correctly stated the doc-
trine of severability, it gave the Labor Commissioner, who histori-
  
 64. See Parry-Bowers, supra note 10, at 449 (“[I]t seems likely that the Commis-
sioner would have little difficulty deciding that any procurement activity in viola-
tion of the Act taints the entire contract so as to make it un-severable.”). 
 65. Id. at 448 (quoting Marathon v. Blasi, 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 158, 164 (Ct. App. 
2006)). 
 66. Id. at 449. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44(a) (West 2003). 
 70. Blanks v. Seyfarth Shaw, 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 710, 729 (Ct. App. 2009). 
 71. See id. (noting the requirement of exhausting administrative remedies). 
 72. See Marathon Entm’t, Inc. v. Blasi, 174 P.3d 741, 755 (Cal. 2008) (rejecting 
both of the artist’s arguments and holding that severability was viable in this case). 
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cally has been predisposed to favoring agents, the option to invali-
date contracts.73  Thus, the court created a rule without any teeth.  If 
the court had truly wanted to sway the Commissioner away from 
voiding personal manager contracts ab initio, it would have used 
stronger language and placed a burden on the Commissioner to 
prove severability was improbable or outweighed the equitable con-
cerns.74 
V. ISSUES WITH THE ACT 
While the Act specifically identifies the roles and interactions of 
a talent agent and artist,75 it never specifically mentions personal 
managers.  The only veiled reference to a personal manager is an 
exception in the definition of “talent agency” stating that “the activi-
ties of procuring, offering, or promising to procure recording con-
tracts for an artist or artists shall not of itself subject a person or cor-
poration to regulation and licensing.”76  The express language ex-
empts only procurement for the purpose of obtaining recording con-
tracts; “negotiation of contracts for live performances, merchandis-
ing, or concert tours” is not excluded and still requires a license.77 
The Act also allows procurement activities by unlicensed indi-
viduals when done in “conjunction with” and “at the request of” li-
censed talent agents.78  On its face, this would seem to provide a 
“safe harbor” for personal managers who work hand-in-hand with 
licensed talent agents.79  However, the exclusion only becomes ef-
fective if the agents are willing to cooperate and validate the lawful 
  
 73. See Parry-Bowers, supra note 10, at 449 (noting that forcing the Commis-
sioner to consider severability offers no guarantees, especially with a Commis-
sioner who continues to side with artists and agents). 
 74. Cf. id. at 448 (weighing the Commissioner’s concerns of complications and 
time consumption against obtaining a fair and equitable result). 
 75. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700.23–.47 (West 2003). 
 76. Id. § 1700.4. 
 77. James M. O’Brien III, Comment, Regulation of Attorneys Under California’s 
Talent Agencies Act: A Tautological Approach to Protecting Artists, 80 CAL. L. 
REV. 471, 500 (1992). 
 78. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44(d). 
 79. See O’Brien, supra note 77, at 500. 
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participation by providing a confirmation letter.80  In many cases, 
however, it is the policy of the talent agency not to provide such let-
ters, thereby negating the idea of a safe harbor.81  This issue is exac-
erbated when the talent agent wants to double as the artist’s personal 
manager, as was the case in Marathon.82 
Chief among the flaws of the Act is its failure to define “pro-
curement,” which has led to inconsistent interpretations by the Labor 
Commissioner and courts, creating an environment where no one is 
quite sure what is allowed.83  The ambiguity leaves unlicensed per-
sonal managers unfairly exposed to staggering potential liability.84  
The Labor Commissioner, the individual responsible for determining 
violations of the Act, and the courts have found the following activi-
ties by unlicensed practitioners to be unlawful procurement: “intro-
ducing artists to producers or directors, initiating contacts with em-
ployers, furthering an offer for an artist-client, and negotiating em-
ployment contracts.”85 
The definition of procurement gets even murkier when a per-
sonal manager puts on a showcase86 for an artist in order to procure a 
recording contract.  In Park v. Deftones, Park, a personal manager, 
argued that his actions in procuring eighty-four showcases for the 
Deftones were excepted from the Act’s licensing requirements be-
cause he procured the showcases for the purpose of obtaining a re-
cording contract.87  Emphasizing the definition of a talent agency in 
the Act, the court found that the exception for talent agents who pro-
cure a recording contract did not apply to Park because he was a not 
a talent agent but a personal manager, who was not covered by the 
  
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. 
 82. Marathon Entm’t, Inc. v. Blasi, 174 P.3d 741, 744 (Cal. 2008). 
 83. Flores, supra note 4, at 1341–42; O’Brien, supra note 77, at 497–99. 
 84. Cf. O’Brien, supra note 77, at 497–99 (discussing the effect of the lack of a 
definition on attorneys). 
 85. Id. at 498. 
 86. A showcase is a live performance by an artist intended to increase the artist’s 
publicity and possibly secure a recording contract.  Hinds v. Leve, No. TAC 18-
00, at 3 n.2 (Cal. Lab. Comm’r July 13, 2001), http://www.dir.ca.gov 
/dlse/TAC/18-00.pdf. 
 87. 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 616, 617–18 (Ct. App. 1999). 
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Act.88  However, in Hinds v. Leve, the Labor Commissioner held that 
because Hinds’ manager succeeded in procuring the recording con-
tract, the manager’s activity could be distinguished from that of the 
manager in Park.89 
The question thus becomes how many showcases constitute a 
violation of the Act.  While it is probably more than one, but cer-
tainly less than eighty, courts have provided no guidance that would 
help personal managers work within the Act and avoid the risk of 
losing all commissions.90  Further, the Labor Commissioner seems to 
allow personal managers to hold showcases only where they succeed 
in obtaining a recording contract, so an unlucky night at a showcase 
may quickly become illegal procurement.91 
Without an incidental booking exception that is equivalent to the 
New York law,92 and with a broad-sweeping interpretation of pro-
curement, a personal manager is constantly put in awkward positions 
as he goes about his work.93  At a cocktail party, a personal manager 
would essentially either have to avoid the topic of work or immedi-
ately excuse himself if a producer or executive discusses a client’s 
work, for such discussion may be perceived as attempting to procure 
employment.94  This problem illustrates that the expansive interpre-
tation of the Act, without an incidental booking exception fails to 
protect the artist at all, which is the original purpose of the Act.95 
Additionally, while the Act protects licensed talent agents from 
children disavowing contracts, it does not protect personal managers 
  
 88. Id. at 618. 
 89. No. TAC 18-00, at 6–7 (Cal. Lab. Comm’r July 13, 2001), 
http://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/TAC/18-00.pdf. 
 90. But see Park, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 619 (noting that even incidental procure-
ment is regulated by the Act). 
 91. Compare id. at 617 (finding illegality when procurement was unsuccessful), 
with Hinds, No. TAC 18-00, at 8–9 (finding no illegality when procurement was 
successful). 
 92. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 171(8) (McKinney 2004). 
 93. See generally Marathon Entm’t, Inc. v. Blasi, 174 P.3d 741, 743 (Cal. 2008) 
(explaining the realistic catch-22 of artists who are not established enough to get 
themselves a talent agent needing to hire personal managers to promote their ca-
reers). 
 94. See Flores, supra note 4, at 1335–37 (providing a hypothetical fact pattern 
resulting in the Labor Commissioner voiding the contract pre-Marathon). 
 95. See Marathon, 174 P.3d at 756. 
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from knowing, responsible adults effectively doing exactly the same 
thing.96  Generally, and in California’s Family Code, a minor can 
disavow a contract prior to reaching majority or within a reasonable 
time thereafter, unless barred by statute.97  Minors are permitted to 
disavow contracts because, in the eyes of the law, minors lack the 
judgment and experience to adequately and fairly contract in their 
best interests.98  In general, a person contracting with a minor does 
so at his own peril.99  The Act, however, specifically denies minors 
the privilege of disavowing an otherwise valid contract when it has 
been approved by the superior court.100  Thus, a talent agent con-
tracting with a child is no longer doing so at his own peril, but rather 
has the protection of the Act behind him.  The Act prohibits minors 
from disavowing talent contracts because talent agents need to rely 
on the assurance that their time and hard work cannot be tossed aside 
simply because the client is a minor.101  However, the Act provides 
no protection for personal managers in their contracts with artists, 
either minors or adults. 
Finally, even if personal managers wanted to become licensed as 
talent agents to procure employment legally, it would invalidate the 
rest of their business model and cap their commission at 10 percent 
because they would come under union control.102  Though it is not a 
requirement to be a part of a union, talent agents become franchised 
  
 96. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.37 (West 2003). 
 97. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6710 (West 2004). 
 98. Sparks v. Sparks, 225 P.2d 238, 243 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950) (“The law shields 
minors from their lack of judgment and experience and confers upon them the 
right to avoid their contracts in order that they may be protected against their own 
improvidence and the designs and machinations of other people, thus discouraging 
adults from contracting with them.”). 
 99. Id. 
100. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.37. 
101. See Thom Hardin, Note, The Regulation of Minors’ Entertainment Con-
tracts: Effective California Law or Hollywood Grandeur?, 19 J. JUV. L. 376, 378 
(1998) (“[A] studio may invest substantial money in these projects because it is 
relying on a minor to fulfill his or her contractual obligations.  If a minor disaf-
firms his or her contract with a motion pictures studio, the studio may lose its 
competitive edge as well as its project investments.”). 
102. See Marathon Entm’t, Inc. v. Blasi, 174 P.3d 741, 745 (Cal. 2008); Zelenski, 
supra note 19, at 989 (discussing the mechanism through which the unions enforce 
their standards). 
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through unions based on a mutual understanding among union mem-
bers not to use non-union members.103  The unions further require 
shorter contract durations and bar producing the artist’s work and 
obtaining a producer’s fee—all standard parts of a personal man-
ager’s contract with an artist.104  This type of “catch-22” situation is 
precisely what personal managers face every day while working for 
their clients’ best interests.105 
VI. ADDING SENSE TO THE TAA 
The Act106 has progressed far past protection for artists and into a 
law with no basis in business or market realities.  In bringing the Act 
back to reality, a number of simple principles can be implemented to 
bring fairness to personal managers who take a great deal of risk in 
emerging artists, only to be hurt by an incidental violation of the Act, 
especially when that violation, the procurement of the employment, 
aids the artist. 
The first change is obvious: allow incidental booking as the 
equivalent New York law does.107  The fear, as stated in Waisbren, is 
that “incidental” is an unworkable standard and would undermine 
the purpose of the Act.108  However, “New York has experienced no 
major problems with its incidental booking exception . . . nor has the 
entertainment industry in New York fallen apart as a result” of hav-
ing this exception.109  Allowing these few instances of procurement 
by personal managers would avoid the hazard of “punish[ing] most 
severely those managers who work hardest and advocate most suc-
cessfully for their clients, allowing the clients to establish them-
  
103. See Zelenski, supra note 19, at 989. 
104. See Marathon, 174 P.3d at 745–46. 
105. See id. at 743 (explaining the complex realities of procuring employment for 
new artists while still trying to remain within the bounds of the Act). 
106. The Act was enacted in 1913 and was later codified into its current form in 
1978.  Talent Agencies Act, ch. 282, 1913 Cal. Stat. 519 (codified as amended at 
CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700–1700.47 (2003 & Supp. 2010)). 
107. See N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 171(8) (McKinney 2004). 
108. Waisbren v. Peppercorn Prods., Inc., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437, 442 (Ct. App. 
1995). 
109. O’Brien, supra note 77, at 509. 
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selves, make themselves marketable to licensed talent agencies, and 
be in a position to turn and renege on commissions,” as the Mara-
thon court lamented prior to noting that they have no authority to 
rewrite the law to include such an exception.110 
Second, the legislature should allow personal managers to pay a 
proactive per employment fee instead of requiring that personal 
managers become a fully-licensed talent agent.  This allows for the 
business reality of procuring employment, especially prior to estab-
lishing the artists at a level for which a talent agent would be inter-
ested.  By allowing this fee, the state would generate income and 
could restrict any booking commission to the union’s standard 10 
percent.  Additionally, this fee would still allow the personal manag-
ers to collect the higher fees for other aspects of their management 
such as counseling, advising, taking care of business arrangements, 
and charting the course of an artist’s career.111 
With this change, personal managers will no longer have to fear 
that their clients will refuse to pay commissions, or that the Labor 
Commissioner will void the entire contract.  The fee itself could be 
sizable enough to discourage personal managers from making a habit 
out of procuring employment.  More importantly, it would be a 
guarantee that the artist could not later come back and invalidate the 
contract on illegal procurement grounds. 
Third, the procurement of employment without a license should 
not be allowed as a defense in a suit seeking commissions by the 
personal manager for employment procurement that occurred more 
than a year prior to the suit.  Rather than looking for ways to protect 
personal managers, the courts continue to be lenient when artists use 
the TAA as a defense.  In Styne v. Stevens, the court ruled that stat-
ute of limitations does not limit this defensive use.112  The Styne 
court differentiated defensive uses of the TAA by saying that 
“[s]tatutes of limitations bar ‘actions or proceedings,’ thus guarding 
against stale claims.”113  Though Styne involved multiple instances 
of procurement, the court’s interpretation allows an artist to keep 
  
110. Marathon, 174 P.3d at 756. 
111. See id. at 745–46. 
112. 26 P.3d 343, 351 (Cal. 2001). 
113. Id. at 350 (citation omitted). 
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even a single instance of procurement in his back pocket to void a 
contract ab initio if the personal manager later files suit. 
This defense should only be allowed if the action occurred within 
one year from the date of the filing of the suit.  Otherwise, a single 
instance of procurement, which is done purely to help the artist 
achieve success, immediately and permanently makes the contract 
voidable by the artist.114  The personal manager’s only hope, and not 
a strong one with the current Labor Commissioner, is severability of 
non-illegal purposes.115 
Finally, the court should, in some cases, enforce the illegal con-
tract.  Where a contract is prohibited merely for the protection of a 
class of persons, as the artists in the Act, the court may award reme-
dies through quantum meruit or quantum valebat.116  In instances 
where the artist both received and appreciated the procurement of 
employment in order to become successful: 
[S]ound public policy may demand either the enforcement of 
an executory illegal agreement . . . such as when a denial of 
such relief by the courts would . . . result in harm to those for 
whose protection such agreements are declared illegal.  Thus, 
in some cases, public policy is best served by rescission or 
enforcement of the agreement, even though the result is to 
permit recovery by a guilty plaintiff . . . .117 
The Act has resulted in unjust enrichment to artists while harm-
ing personal managers.  Artists are, on one hand, gaining a benefit 
from the procurement activities of their personal manager while, at 
the same time, holding these incidents of procurement in their back 
  
114. See Marathon, 174 P.3d at 748 (holding that a single act of procurement can 
violate the Act). 
115. Severability applies only “when the parties have contracted, in part, for 
something illegal.  Notwithstanding any such illegality, it preserves and enforces 
any lawful portion of a parties’ contract that feasibly may be severed.”  Id. at 750–
51.  Severability allows the personal manager to be compensated for any services 
provided which do not violate any laws, such as paying an artist’s rent or provid-
ing loans as artists struggle to break into the industry.  See id. 
116. 8 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS § 19:76 (4th ed. 1998). 
117. Id. § 19:75 (footnotes omitted). 
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pockets in case a problem ever arises.118  A personal manager’s pro-
curement for his client helps everyone involved and hurts no one: the 
artist gains notoriety and gets compensation for his work; the per-
sonal manager gets notoriety for his client which improves the like-
lihood of his client’s success; and a talent agent who is uninvolved 
in the procurement gains a potential client because the artist could 
potentially gain enough notoriety to be worthy of a talent contract.119 
In fact, the talent agent only stands to gain from the personal 
manager procuring employment; the talent agent would not have 
gotten the commission for procurement because the artists for whom 
personal managers work typically are not established enough to 
make it worth a talent agent’s time.120  Despite the benefits that a 
personal manager confers on the artist and the unknowing talent 
agent, it is only the personal manager who stands to suffer if the art-
ist brings a claim under the Act. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Personal managers take a staggering amount of risk when they 
represent new artists.121  They take a greater degree of involvement 
by lending money to young artists, and serving as spokespersons and 
sometimes as business managers.122  Even with all of the hard work, 
personal managers risk their entire contract being invalidated for 
procuring employment by doing exactly what the artists want—
making them a success.123 
While normally progressive, the California courts and legislature 
continue to take an approach with the Talent Agencies Act that dis-
regards the business and market realities of a personal manager’s 
interaction with an artist.  Rather than allow the invalidation of an 
entire contract at the hands of a predisposed Labor Commissioner, 
  
118. See, e.g., Styne, 26 P.3d at 351. 
119. See Flores, supra note 4, at 1335–36. 
120. See id. at 1335. 
121. Marathon Entm’t, Inc. v. Blasi, 174 P.3d 741, 745–46 (Cal. 2008). 
122. Id. 
123. See generally id. at 743 (explaining the realistic catch-22 of artists who are 
not established enough to get talent agents and who need to hire personal manag-
ers to promote their careers). 
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the courts must be stronger in their language and directives, and the 
legislature must step up and create an incidental booking exception.  
Further, the courts must apply basic contract principles and prohibit 
the use of procurement as a defense outside of a statute of limita-
tions.  Without these basic principles, fewer artists may be discov-
ered due to personal managers’ fears that they will have a contract 
voided.124  In order to truly protect artists, as the aim of the Act 
claims to be, the courts and legislature must protect the personal 
managers so they feel secure finding and promoting the next needle 
in a haystack. 
  
124. See id. 
